Can the government see what I do on my phone?
·Written by the developer of Stash
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Can the government see what I do on my phone? In the United States, not by simply looking: the Supreme Court has held that police generally need a warrant to search a phone's contents (Riley v. California, 2014) and to obtain a long history of its location from a carrier (Carpenter v. United States, 2018). What authorities can do is request records from the companies that hold your data, such as Apple and your carrier, using a subpoena, a court order or a search warrant depending on the kind of data. How much those companies are able to hand over depends largely on how the data is encrypted.
This page describes US practice only, cites the primary source for each point, and is current as of 12 November 2026. It is general information, not legal advice; for a specific situation, speak to a lawyer.
Who holds what, and what it takes to get it
| Data | Who holds it | What US authorities generally need | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| Contents of the phone itself | You | A search warrant, with case-specific exceptions | Riley v. California |
| Name, address, billing and calling records | Carrier | A subpoena | Verizon transparency report |
| Past location from cell towers | Carrier | A search warrant | Carpenter v. United States |
| Live content of calls | Carrier | A wiretap order from a judge | Verizon transparency report |
| Apple Account details, connection logs | Apple | A subpoena or greater legal process | Apple Legal Process Guidelines |
| iCloud content Apple can decrypt | Apple | A search warrant | Apple Legal Process Guidelines |
| iCloud content that is end-to-end encrypted | Apple stores it but has no key | Apple cannot decrypt it | Apple Legal Process Guidelines |
| A device crossing the border | You | CBP searches under its border authority; an advanced search needs reasonable suspicion or a national security concern | CBP |
The sections below take these one at a time.
Can police search your phone?
Generally only with a warrant. In Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), the Supreme Court held: "The police generally may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested." The opinion ends with the Court's answer to what police must do before searching a phone seized in an arrest: "get a warrant."
Two limits on that rule are worth knowing. The Court left room for exceptions in a particular case, such as a real emergency (exigent circumstances). And Riley is about searches during an arrest; other legal situations follow their own rules. The Ninth Circuit, for example, held in 2024 that Riley did not apply to the search of a parolee's phone under his parole conditions (United States v. Payne).
A warrant is also not the same thing as access. Apple's guidelines for US law enforcement state that for all devices running iOS 8.0 and later, "Apple is unable to perform an iOS device data extraction as the data typically sought by law enforcement is encrypted, and Apple does not possess the encryption key", and that Apple does not have access to a customer's passcode (Apple Legal Process Guidelines, US, published October 2025). That is a statement about what Apple can do. It says nothing about the tools an agency may have of its own, and this page makes no claim about them.
Can police track your phone?
Location can come from two places: your carrier and, to a much smaller degree, Apple.
Carrier records. A phone connects to cell towers all day, and carriers keep time-stamped records of those connections, called cell-site location information. In Carpenter v. United States (2018), investigators had obtained 127 days of such records, 12,898 location points, with a court order that did not require probable cause. The Supreme Court held that acquiring those records was a search under the Fourth Amendment and that "the Government will generally need a warrant to access CSLI". The Court called its own decision narrow: it noted that exceptions such as exigent circumstances may still apply, and that it was not ruling on conventional surveillance tools such as security cameras or on collection for national security purposes.
Apple. Apple's guidelines say Find My "cannot be activated remotely" or "upon a request from a government or law enforcement agency", and that "device location services information is stored on each individual device and Apple cannot retrieve this information from any specific device". What Apple can produce are Find My connection logs, kept for up to 25 days, in response to a subpoena or greater legal process.
What your carrier can hand over
Carriers hold the records the phone network itself produces. Verizon's transparency report sets out the tiers it applies:
- Subpoena (can be issued without a judge): subscriber information and calling and payment records. Verizon states: "We do not release any content of a communication in response to a subpoena."
- Pen register or trap and trace order: real-time information about numbers dialed or calling in, not the content of a call.
- Warrant: stored content. "We require a warrant before disclosing stored content to law enforcement", except in emergencies involving danger of death or serious physical injury.
- Wiretap order: the live content of communications, which requires a judge to find probable cause.
The lower bar for calling records goes back to older Supreme Court decisions that Carpenter discusses: the Court had previously found no expectation of privacy in records of dialed numbers conveyed to a telephone company (Smith v. Maryland), and Carpenter left that in place while declining to extend it to location history.
What Apple can and cannot hand over
Apple's US guidelines draw the same line between records and content. With the exception of emergencies, "Apple will only provide content in response to a search warrant issued upon a showing of probable cause, or customer consent."
- With a subpoena or greater legal process: basic customer information (name, address, email, phone number) and connection logs with IP addresses. iCloud connection logs are retained up to 25 days.
- With a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) or a warrant: transactional records such as iCloud mail logs (time, date, sender and recipient addresses).
- With a search warrant: iCloud content as it exists in the account. Apple's list includes "email, stored photos, documents, contacts, calendars, bookmarks, Safari Browsing History, Maps Search History, Messages and iOS device backups", and backups "may include photos and videos in the Camera Roll, device settings, app data, iMessage, Business Chat, SMS, and MMS messages and voicemail".
- iMessage and FaceTime in transit: Apple states these are end-to-end encrypted, that it "cannot intercept iMessage communications" and "does not have iMessage communication logs". It does keep capability query logs (a record that a device looked up whether a contact can receive iMessage) for up to 25 days.
- Emergencies: federal law permits, but does not require, Apple to disclose information without a warrant if it believes in good faith that there is imminent danger of death or serious physical injury.
Does Apple tell you? Its stated policy is to notify customers when their account information is sought, unless a court order or law prohibits notice, or in cases such as child endangerment or a risk of injury or death.
How often does it happen? Apple publishes the numbers twice a year at apple.com/legal/transparency. National security requests may only be reported in ranges: for July to December 2025, Apple reports between 500 and 999 FISA content requests and between 0 and 499 National Security Letters. Apple notes that it does not produce transactional information or connection logs in response to National Security Letters.
Is iCloud encrypted?
Yes, all of it, but there are two levels, and the difference is who holds the key. Apple's iCloud data security overview describes them:
| iCloud data | Standard data protection (default) | Advanced Data Protection (optional) |
|---|---|---|
| Photos | Encrypted; Apple holds the keys | End-to-end encrypted |
| iCloud Backup, including device and Messages backup | Encrypted; Apple holds the keys | End-to-end encrypted |
| iCloud Drive, Notes | Encrypted; Apple holds the keys | End-to-end encrypted |
| Messages in iCloud | End-to-end encrypted, but see below | End-to-end encrypted |
| Passwords and Keychain, Health data | End-to-end encrypted | End-to-end encrypted |
| iCloud Mail, Contacts, Calendars | Encrypted; Apple holds the keys | Encrypted; Apple holds the keys |
With standard protection, 15 data categories are end-to-end encrypted; with Advanced Data Protection, 25. Two details matter:
- The Messages key. Under standard protection, Apple states: "When iCloud Backup is enabled, your backup includes a copy of the Messages in iCloud encryption key". Since Apple holds the key to a standard backup, messages stored that way are within reach of a warrant served on Apple. With Advanced Data Protection the backup and the key inside it are end-to-end encrypted.
- Metadata. Even with Advanced Data Protection, some metadata, such as modification dates and checksums of files and photos, stays under standard protection.
Apple's law-enforcement guidelines match this: with Advanced Data Protection on, "Apple cannot decrypt certain iCloud content, including Photos, iCloud Drive, Backup, Notes, and Safari Bookmarks", while email, contacts and calendars may still be provided in response to a warrant.
Advanced Data Protection is off unless you turn it on, under Settings > [your name] > iCloud > Advanced Data Protection. It requires iOS 16.2 or later, two-factor authentication and a recovery contact or recovery key, because Apple can then no longer help you recover that data (Apple Support). More on how iCloud treats photos: how to keep photos out of iCloud.
Can Apple see my photos?
Photos that exist only on your iPhone are not available to Apple; the company states it cannot extract data from a locked device running iOS 8 or later. Photos synced to iCloud Photos under standard data protection are encrypted on Apple's servers with keys that Apple holds, so Apple is technically able to decrypt them and lists "stored photos" among the content it may provide in response to a search warrant. With Advanced Data Protection on, Photos are end-to-end encrypted and Apple states it cannot decrypt them.
Can police force you to unlock your phone?
This is unsettled, and courts differ. The question turns on the Fifth Amendment, which bars compelled self-incriminating testimony. A Congressional Research Service legal sidebar summed up the state of the law this way: "Courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether and when the compelled decryption" of a device violates the Fifth Amendment, with a tendency toward "more constitutional protection for password-protected devices than for devices protected by a biometric identifier" (CRS, LSB10416, March 2020). As one example on the biometric side, the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Payne (2024) that the compelled use of a thumb to unlock a phone "was not testimonial because it required no cognitive exertion". Other courts have reached different results on both passcodes and biometrics, and the CRS noted that the Supreme Court had declined to review earlier passcode cases. What applies to you depends on the state, the court and the facts, which is a question for a lawyer.
Phone searches at the US border
The border follows its own rules. US Customs and Border Protection states on its page Border Search of Electronic Devices (last modified 4 August 2026) that all persons arriving in or departing from the United States, regardless of citizenship, are subject to inspection, including their devices.
- Basic search: an officer reviews the device by hand, without external equipment.
- Advanced search: an officer connects equipment "to copy, and/or analyze" the contents. CBP says this requires reasonable suspicion of a violation of a law it enforces, or a national security concern, and approval by a senior manager.
- Cloud data: "CBP officers may not use the device to access information that is solely stored remotely." Officers make sure network connections are disabled first, for example through airplane mode.
- If a device cannot be inspected: CBP says a US citizen "will not be denied entry into the United States based on CBP's inability" to inspect a device. For a foreign national, it may be considered in the admissibility decision. In either case the device "may be subject to exclusion, detention, or other appropriate action".
- How often: CBP reports 55,318 device searches in fiscal year 2025, out of more than 419 million travelers processed, and says 92 percent were basic searches.
Common misunderstandings
- "The government watches everyone's phone live." The legal routes above are requests for specific accounts and records, each with a stated legal standard. Apple's and carriers' transparency reports show the volume.
- "Encrypted means nobody else has a key." For default iCloud data, Apple holds the keys. End-to-end encryption is the narrower category.
- "iMessage is end-to-end encrypted, so my messages are not in any backup." With a standard iCloud Backup, the backup includes a copy of the Messages key.
Where Stash fits
Stash: Calculator Photo Vault stores files encrypted on the device with AES-256 behind a PIN. There is no account and no Stash server that receives vault files; a backup exists only if you start one yourself, to your own iCloud Drive or Google Drive (a Premium feature that is never automatic). That is a description of where the data lives, not a promise about any investigator, agency or court order.
Other pages in this series: how to tell if your phone is tapped, how to tell if your phone is being tracked, how to tell if your phone is hacked, how to find spyware on iPhone and is my phone listening to me.
FAQ
Can the government see what I do on my phone?
Not directly or continuously. In the US, authorities obtain specific data through legal process: a warrant for the phone's contents and for location history, a subpoena for subscriber and calling records, and a warrant for content that companies such as Apple are able to decrypt.
Can police track your phone?
They can obtain location records from your carrier, and under Carpenter v. United States (2018) that generally requires a warrant, with exceptions for emergencies. Apple states that Find My cannot be activated remotely at an agency's request.
Can police search your phone without a warrant?
Generally no. Riley v. California (2014) held that police may not search the digital information on a phone seized in an arrest without a warrant. The Court allowed for case-specific exceptions such as emergencies, and border searches and parole conditions follow different rules.
Can police force you to unlock your phone?
Courts differ. Decisions so far have tended to give a memorized passcode more Fifth Amendment protection than a fingerprint or face, but not consistently. Ask a lawyer about your state.
Can Apple see my photos?
Not the ones stored only on your iPhone. Photos in iCloud under the default setting are encrypted with keys Apple holds, so Apple can technically decrypt them and can be required to by a search warrant. With Advanced Data Protection, Apple states it cannot.
Is iCloud encrypted?
Yes. By default Apple holds the keys for most categories, including Photos, Backup, Drive and Notes; 15 categories are end-to-end encrypted. With Advanced Data Protection turned on, 25 categories are end-to-end encrypted. Mail, Contacts and Calendars are not end-to-end encrypted in either mode.
Can border agents search my phone?
Yes. CBP states that all travelers' devices are subject to search at the border. Advanced searches with external equipment require reasonable suspicion or a national security concern, and officers may not use the device to access data stored only in the cloud.